At first glance, Iran’s prolonged internet shutdown may appear to be a temporary security measure aimed at containing unrest or preventing images of repression from reaching the outside world. But the continuation of severe connectivity restrictions for more than seventy days points to something far deeper than crowd control or censorship.

What the Iranian authorities appear to fear is not merely the circulation of information, but the social and political connectivity that allows dissent to transform into collective action.

In contemporary societies, the internet is no longer simply a communication tool. It has become part of the infrastructure of collective mobilisation: a space where local protests become nationally visible, where images of repression circulate within minutes, and where isolated acts of dissent acquire social meaning through connection.

This is precisely why authoritarian states increasingly treat digital networks not as neutral technologies, but as political battlegrounds.

The sociologist Manuel Castells argued in his theory of the “network society” that power in the modern world depends increasingly on controlling flows of information and communication. In such a system, social movements are not necessarily organised through rigid hierarchies or traditional party structures. Students, workers, families of political prisoners, neighborhood protest groups and underground resistance networks can become interconnected nodes within a broader movement.

For the Iranian regime, this interconnectedness itself appears to be the threat.

Governments can often suppress isolated protests. What becomes far more dangerous is when fragmented grievances evolve into a connected social network capable of coordination, mutual encouragement and collective awareness. The internet allows a protest in one city to rapidly become a national experience. It allows citizens to realise that dissent is not isolated and that others continue to resist.

Seen in this light, the internet shutdown is not simply about blocking news. It is about disrupting the connective tissue of resistance.

The objective is not only to silence communication with the outside world, but to weaken communication within society itself: preventing protest groups, activists and local resistance units from remaining aware of one another, exchanging information, sustaining morale and developing horizontal forms of coordination.

Without those connections, dissent risks remaining fragmented and localised. With them, it can evolve into a broader political force.

Some reports and statements emerging from circles close to Iran’s security apparatus suggest that authorities are particularly concerned about communication between resistance units and wider protest networks. Whether or not the government openly acknowledges this, the scale and duration of the blackout indicate a deeper structural anxiety toward what might be called a “connected society”.

In the age of networked politics, authoritarian states no longer seek only to imprison dissidents. Increasingly, they seek to imprison connectivity itself.

Iran’s leadership appears to understand that digital networks do more than transmit information. They generate social trust and solidarity. Every message, video or image has the potential to reinforce the perception that resistance continues elsewhere.

This is why internet blackouts often precede or accompany large-scale repression.

The November 2019 protests in Iran demonstrated this logic clearly. Before the bloodshed escalated, the country was digitally sealed off from both the outside world and from itself. A society unable to see, hear or communicate becomes easier to suppress. Communication blackouts are therefore not secondary measures; they are part of the architecture of repression.

Yet the extraordinary duration of the current restrictions also conveys another message: the regime still does not appear to feel secure.

If the authorities believed that the protest movement had been fully neutralized, there would be little need to sustain such extensive disruptions for so long. The persistence of the blackout suggests continuing fears of renewed mobilization and the reactivation of protest networks.

The recent wave of hurried executions targeting political prisoners, including alleged members of resistance networks and younger protesters associated with Gen Z dissent, reinforces the impression of a state confronting a deeper structural crisis.

One of the most important functions of digital connectivity in protest movements is that it breaks political isolation. Authoritarian systems depend heavily on convincing citizens that they are alone, powerless and unsupported. Networks undermine that isolation. When individuals realize that others continue to resist, private fear can gradually evolve into collective confidence.

Authoritarian regimes generally fear isolated individuals less than connected citizens.

What they fear most is the moment when dispersed frustrations become conscious of one another and begin to act as part of a larger social force.

A government that fears connectivity at this level ultimately reveals something deeper: it fears society itself. And a state forced to isolate an entire country in order to preserve political control reveals not confidence in its stability, but profound anxiety about its fragility.

Enayat is a political scientist and Iran specialist, collaborating with the Iranian democratic opposition NCRI. He is on X at @h_enayat