With Operation Epic Fury underway in Iran, the question of the Islamic Republic’s future is no longer confined to academic speculation or the rhetoric of dissidents abroad. It has become an urgent strategic matter for the United States and its allies.

After years of domestic unrest, economic collapse, and growing popular resistance, the durability of the ruling system in Iran is increasingly uncertain. What matters now is not merely whether the current system crumbles, but whether a credible democratic alternative is ready to assume responsibility when it does.

A crucial development occurred on February 28, 2026, when Maryam Rajavi – president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran – announced the formation of a provisional governing framework designed to guide Iran through the crucial period following the collapse of the ruling establishment.

Her announcement deserves serious attention in Washington because it addresses the central strategic question that has long haunted discussions about Iran: What comes next?

For decades, critics of regime change in Tehran have invoked the specter of chaos – often assuming that the only alternative to the Islamic Republic would be instability. But regime change from within, a concept I have explored in my scholarship, offers a fundamentally different pathway than externally imposed transformation.

Rather than  externally engineered governance, regime change from within involves the transfer of sovereignty to the Iranian people themselves, enabling them to dismantle authoritarian rule and construct democratic institutions through their own political agency.

The objective is the replacement of the ruling theocracy with a democratic republic grounded in pluralism, secular governance, and the rule of law. The political blueprint for such a transition already exists in Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan, which calls for universal suffrage, gender equality, freedom of expression and assembly, separation of religion and state, and a non-nuclear Iran that lives peacefully with its neighbors – a plan that former National Security Advisor General James Jones recently referred to as “Jeffersonian.”

What Rajavi’s February announcement makes clear is that the Iranian opposition is not merely protesting the current regime – it is preparing for governance after its fall.

Stage I: The Immediate Transitional Period

The first phase would occur immediately following the overthrow or collapse of the ruling establishment. According to the proposal, a provisional government would administer the country for a maximum of six months.

This interim authority would have a narrowly defined mandate. Its purpose would not be to entrench itself in power but to stabilize the country, dismantle repressive structures, and prepare the ground for democratic elections.Key priorities during this phase would include: restoring civil liberties and political freedoms; releasing political prisoners; dissolving instruments of political repression; guaranteeing freedom of political organization for all democratic parties and movements; and establishing the legal and administrative framework necessary for national elections.

The brevity of this transitional period is essential. It reflects an understanding that legitimacy in a post-authoritarian Iran must come from the ballot box, not revolutionary authority.

Stage II: Preparing for Free and Fair Elections

The second phase would involve organizing nationwide elections based on universal suffrage. Iran has a politically sophisticated population with a deep history of civic engagement. What it lacks is the institutional infrastructure for genuinely competitive elections free from ideological vetting or clerical oversight.

The provisional government would therefore work with international election observers and democratic institutions to ensure that the vote is transparent, inclusive, and credible. Iranians both inside and outside the country would participate in shaping the nation’s future.

Unlike the controlled elections currently conducted under the Islamic Republic – where candidates must pass ideological screening – this process would be open to all political persuasions that accept democratic principles. Such an election would represent the first truly free national vote in modern Iranian history.

Stage III: A Constituent Assembly and a New Constitution

The elections would produce representatives to a constituent assembly, the body responsible for drafting a new constitution for a democratic Iranian republic.

This phase is critical because it shifts the transition from revolutionary upheaval to constitutional governance. The assembly would debate the structure of the future state: the separation of powers, protections for individual rights, the role of the judiciary, and the mechanisms that ensure civilian control over the military.

Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan provides guiding principles for this process, but the ultimate authority would rest with the Iranian people through their elected representatives. Once drafted, the constitution would be submitted to a national referendum, ensuring that the foundational document of the new republic derives its legitimacy from popular consent.

Policy Recommendations for Washington

For U.S. policymakers, the significance of this roadmap lies in its emphasis on preparedness. Too often, discussions of regime collapse focus solely on the moment of upheaval while neglecting the structures required to sustain democratic governance afterward.

The Iranian opposition’s proposed transitional framework addresses that gap.

It signals that organized democratic forces are thinking not just about resistance, but about statecraft – how to rebuild institutions, protect rights, and restore Iran’s place in the international community.

For the United States, this creates an opportunity to align policy with a credible democratic alternative rather than defaulting to the false choice between military confrontation and passive acceptance of authoritarian rule.

The Trump administration should consider several immediate actions.

First, Washington should recognize the strategic importance of organized democratic opposition movements. Engagement with the National Council of Resistance of Iran should be treated as part of a broader dialogue about Iran’s democratic future.

Second, U.S. officials should support the principle that Iran’s future government must emerge from free elections supervised by international observers. Publicly endorsing this standard reinforces the legitimacy of democratic transition while delegitimizing authoritarian continuity.

Third, Washington should coordinate with European allies to establish a transitional assistance framework – legal, technical, and humanitarian – that could be activated if political transformation occurs. Preparing now will reduce the risk of instability later.

Fourth, the United States should expand support for internet freedom, communications access, and civil society networks inside Iran. These tools strengthen the ability of Iranians themselves to organize, mobilize, and participate in democratic processes.

Finally, policymakers should make clear that a future democratic Iran – one that adheres to the principles articulated in Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan – would be welcomed back into the international community as a responsible partner.

The future of Iran will ultimately be decided by Iranians themselves. No foreign government can or should dictate that outcome. But the United States can recognize when a credible democratic pathway emerges – and help ensure that it succeeds.

The provisional authority announced by Maryam Rajavi offers precisely such a pathway: a transition limited in time, grounded in universal suffrage, and culminating in a constitution written by the representatives of the Iranian people.

For decades, analysts have asked whether Iran possesses a viable democratic alternative to its current system. That question is now being answered. The challenge for Washington is whether it has the foresight to recognize it – and the wisdom to support it.

 Ivan Sascha Sheehan is the interim dean of the College of Public Affairs at the University of Baltimore where he is a professor of public and international affairs. The views expressed are the author’s own. Follow him on X @ProfSheehan